What might a progressive foreign policy look like -- not just in theory but also in practice? In recent months, there have been numerous efforts to forge a workable alternative to the belligerency of neoconservatism and the amorality of neo-realism, including proposals from Michael Signer, Madeleine Albright, Robert Wright, and Peter Beinart. Several common themes come up repeatedly, themes that may very well animate a new progressive consensus on foreign policy. But despite their ambition, the contributions in question address only vaguely the inevitable moral and strategic dilemmas that would-be Democratic policy-makers will have to face.
Beinart's book, for example, is an invigorating call to arms. But critical questions remain unanswered. Yes, we must promote democracy abroad. We must offer a new Marshall Plan for the Middle East. But the battle we fight today is different than the one we fought in the Cold War for a fundamental reason: If we now know who our enemy is -- Islamic extremism or Islamic totalitarianism, depending on your preference -- it is not clear that we know who our friends are, the allies who will stand beside us in this new struggle.
In the Bush era, practically no one in the Middle East supports U.S. foreign policy, however broadly construed. Even pro-American Arab liberals -- an increasingly endangered minority -- have largely given up on the United States. Moreover, mainstream Islamists, feeding off the burgeoning fury of the grass roots, grow ever more powerful and influential. If there were truly free and fair elections, Islamist parties would come to power in nearly every single Arab country. The central dilemma, then, is a familiar one: we seek democracy, but we fear what it might bring.
The “democratic dilemma” has become yet more confounding in recent years. The more that anti-American sentiment increases in light of ongoing crises in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories, the more costly promoting democracy becomes. The Bush administration, for all its bluster, has not resolved these confused knots of American policy.
The administration's many failures have demonstrated, quite convincingly, that the war on terrorism cannot be won through military strength alone or a faith-based belief in the righteousness of one's cause. Our adversaries are emboldened. Iran and Hezbollah have come out of the most recent Israeli-Lebanese conflict stronger and more influential. In a sign of things to come, last week, after the U.N.-sponsored cease-fire took effect, Hamas proclaimed that it had found inspiration in Hezbollah's example.
Because of the nature of the challenge before us, competence and intelligence -- both of which Democrats have in abundance -- will not suffice. Islamic extremism represents an existential challenge to the very moral foundations of our country, for the simple reason that large-scale terrorist attacks on the homeland will make it much more difficult -- if not impossible -- for us to stay free. As such, Democrats must make national security not just a top priority but the top priority. (There is a difference.) A progressive foreign policy would elevate democracy promotion as its primary component -- not only because it is right, but because it is necessary. For a movement and a political party that continue to grope for “big ideas,” a focus on democracy would transform a set of seemingly unrelated policies into a cohesive vision that can inspire and reassure Americans. We do indeed have a story to tell, and it is this: America will close, finally, the long-standing gap between words and deeds; we will, today, wage a war on the twin perils of tyranny and terrorism; and we will not stop until we have won.
A few points should be made clear at the outset. The progressive approach to democracy promotion is distinguished by a fundamental realization that democracy cannot be imposed at gunpoint. The United States can, however, effectively pressure Arab governments to democratize by making economic and military aid conditional on a pre-established set of markers emphasizing freedom of expression, free elections, and the rights of opposition groups. In practice, this would mean telling Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, King Abdullah of Jordan, and others that if they do not get serious about political reform, the United States will get serious about slashing foreign aid. For governments that demonstrate a willingness to change, a comprehensive package of incentives will be offered. A successful democracy promotion policy consists of more than just a statement of intent. It requires a sustained commitment, clear objectives, and detailed policy prescriptions tailored for each country's particular needs and challenges.
Democracy promotion should no longer be viewed as one policy instrument among many. Rather, a democracy-centric foreign policy will provide an integrated approach that will, in turn, clarify other important U.S. objectives:
Even so, illiberal Islamist parties will still likely come to power in free elections. This is a reality we must come to terms with. Working with these emerging governments, at least initially, will be frustrating. Anticipating these difficulties, we must begin to engage in dialogue with mainstream Islamist parties sooner rather than later. Over the long-term, the responsibilities of government are likely to privilege pragmatism over ideology, practicality over posturing. Democracy does not always moderate ideological actors, but, in the right conditions and with sustained international involvement, it can and will.
This is all ambitious, to be sure; America, in its finest hour, has been distinguished by its moral ambition. Progressives must begin to appreciate and harness what Michael Signer refers to as the “enormous latent authority in America's almost congenital idealism.” If they don't, progressives in power, while likely proving to be competent managers of an interdependent world, will fail to inspire it. No doubt, they will also fail to inspire Americans.
At the same time, if expectations are raised too high, they will only too easily be shattered. Democracy promotion is not a cure-all panacea, and the Bush administration was wrong to make it seem like it was. Along the way, we will make mistakes; this is fine as long as we admit them readily. We are great not because we are perfect, but because we are not, and more importantly, because we realize it. Beinart argues in The Good Fight that it is this capacity for self-doubt -- in his words, the “recognition that we are not angels” -- that has long defined the liberal approach to foreign policy.
Progressives today must come to terms with the fact that, while supporting democracy is not always in America's short-term interest, it need not be. In the long run, a foreign policy that puts democracy promotion at its center is the only way to secure our strategic interests, stay true to our ideals, and keep America safe. Democracy must be the new calling for our coming struggle. With it, progressives can show the American people that we do indeed have a plan, a vision, and a narrative. Armed with a newfound confidence and clarity of purpose, we will begin the work that Republicans chose to neglect, and wage the war on terrorism and autocracy anew.
Shadi Hamid is founding member and associate at The Project on Middle East Democracy. He is a contributor to Democracy Arsenal, the Security and Peace Initiative's foreign affairs blog.
If you enjoyed this article, subscribe to The American Prospect here.
Support independent media with a tax-deductible donation here.
