Moral Hazard and Bear Stearns
The WSJ discusses the Fed's bailout of Bear Stearns. It reports that the Fed wanted to keep the purchase price down as a way of preventing a problem of moral hazard, in which the Fed would be rewarding the company's stockholders and managers for taking big risks and losing.
The Fed was only partially successful in this effort, since Bear Stearns managed to push up the original price by a factor of five. This money was paid to Bear stockholders in exchange for a $30 billion guarantee from the Fed, not for the value of Bear's assets.
But the direct payment is actually the less important aspect of moral hazard in this story. The far more important aspect, which was totally missing from the WSJ article, is the guarantee to Bear Stearn's customers. The Fed assured all of Bear Stearn's creditors that it would insure Bear's obligations, even though Bear lacked the capital to meet its commitments. It also explicitly made the same guarantee to the customers of the other major investment banks.
This commitment creates an enormous moral hazard problem. Ordinarily, creditors would be very cautious dealing with investment banks of questionable solvency. However, if the loans come backed up by a Fed guarantee, then there is no reason to be concerned about the solvency of the bank.
In such circumstances, investment banks have an incentive to take large risks. Effectively, the Fed has created a "heads I win, tails you lose" situation for the banks and their customers. If they take a big risk and win, they gain make large gains. If they lose, then the Fed covers the losses for the customers, although not for the bank. Nonetheless the opportunity for the creditors to make large one-sided bets is very valuable, so creditors will be willing to share part of this windfall with the banks in the form of large fees.
(If this sounds far-fetched, it shouldn't. It happens all the time. A big bank goes to a state or local government or pension fund or anyone else with a pool of money and promises them a better return with their new swap/derivative whatever. They then tell them their investment is guaranteed by big bank. While a guarantee from Bears Stearn in February should have been seen as completely worthless, when Ben Bernanke stands behind it, such a guarantee is gold.)
This is the situation that led to the huge losses for Savings and Loan institutions in the 80s. If the Fed cannot find a way to impose much more stringent oversight of the investment banks than had been in place, the moral hazard problem it has created virtually guarantees large losses for taxpayers in the future.
--Dean Baker
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COMMENTS (17)
Dean,
You nailed it.
Taking it a step further, FDIC insurance is the ultimate moral hazard situation.
Posted by: Robert Wegner | April 3, 2008 11:55 PM
Robert and Dean,
You are wrong. FDIC insurance only covers up to $100K per account (at least that's the stated principle). If large depositors are dumb enough to deposit $1 million at a bank, they are taking a risk. Of course, you will say what aobut Bank of New England or the too-big-to-fail theory. That's true but it's not automatic or guarantee that you will get your entire $1 million back. Moreover, it will take a long long time to recover that amount from the FDIC.
A large gty as the Bear's one, it often comes with some kind of cease and desist order. I don't know for sure if there's one. So do you know if there's one?
Posted by: James | April 4, 2008 2:20 AM
James wrote, FDIC insurance only covers up to $100K per account (at least that's the stated principle). If large depositors are dumb enough to deposit $1 million at a bank, they are taking a risk.
What if they split it into 10 accounts?
Posted by: liberal | April 4, 2008 5:30 AM
James,
So you don't think a few banks out there might be a bit concerned if FDIC insurance was pulled?
Posted by: Robert Wegner | April 4, 2008 7:32 AM
On a related note, have you seen a good explanation or evidence that the bankruptcy of Bear would have brought down the world economy? They make some hand wavy statements about how Bear was involved through networks or swaps in staggering amounts of derivatives and debt, but really, how does this mean Bear dies, world collapses?
Posted by: Erik L | April 4, 2008 7:53 AM
Certainly the employees and officers of Bear were not bailed out.
But as you note the purchasers of the mortgage derivatives are now insured by the U.S. gov. That appears to me to be a guarantee and a reward.
How do these risktaking consumers differ from the risktaking homeowner currently facing the loss of their home? Their wealth?
Posted by: Paul | April 4, 2008 8:18 AM
The discouraging thing is how this happens over and over (e.g. S&L's, Continental Illinois, LCTM etc.) and the media, pundits and even many economists don't learn.
The idea that the demise of Bear Stearns would mean the collapse of the world economy is obviously in the interests of Wall Street, but it is also something that tends to bulk up the reputation and importance of the Fed and monetary policy in general. If we don't have another Great Depression, this will be another instance of the "Maestro", now Bernanke, saving the world.
Posted by: skeptonomist | April 4, 2008 9:43 AM
Ummmm, the way I understand it this deal isn't limited to FDIC amounts. Bernanke has basically guaranteed _all_ Bear Stearn's assets. Period.
Posted by: drdent42 | April 4, 2008 9:56 AM
Erik L wrote, but really, how does this mean Bear dies, world collapses?
Not sure I think it's true, but the rationale is that Bear dies, can't honor its contracts. So the counterparties on various contracts---particularly derivatives---get stiffed. This causes some of them (particularly those that are leveraged) to have problems, creating a cascade.
Posted by: liberal | April 4, 2008 11:52 AM
Hi,
The comments are quite interesting. The moral hazard question is compelling. If we are to have a robust financial market that is "self-regulating" as many claim the market be, then the investment banks must have the freedom to fail as well as the freedom to succeed. I don't know whether anyone involved can reliably estimate the consequences of a Bear-Steans failure. It seems that everyone can recognize that financial transaction that created the Bear-Stearns crisis have either been unregulated or under regulated.
The key areas that regulation should address are:
1. leverage; and
2. financial accounting reporting.
We traditionally have regulated bank leverage through capitalization and reserve reqirements. My understanding is that the Federal Reserve, the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation all play arcane roles in the process of defining and regulating bank leverage.
The financial accounting and reporting regulation is, to my understanding, much less well regulated. The same institutions, the Securities Exchance Commission and the Financial Accounting Standards Board all play some role.
Does anyone believe that the business practices employed by investment banks could would fly under the public's radar screen if the regulators actually required the investment banks to disclose their capital, their leverage and their potential liabilities arising from the "derivatives", "swaps" and other financial instruments the investment banks so glibly trade?
Let's hope we can find a few grownups willing to run for office impose sensible regulation on the investment banking industry. If we don't we shall be bankrupted by Wall Street bailouts.
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Posted by: ffdd | April 8, 2008 1:14 AM
The diagnosis is not at issue: moral hazard risks abound.
The cure, then, will maximize the likelihood that gratuitous moral hazard is too impolitic.
Historically, a job largely for the fourth estate (e.g., Jacob Riis, H.L. Mencken).
How, then, to make it maximally profitable for the fourth estate of today to muckrake?
Imho, the key insights:
1) The introduction of particular online markets, starting with a new kind of market for the ad spaces on blogs, will provide people with new and improved ways to develop, showcase and profit from expertise.
2) Owning popular markets of the aforesaid kinds is an ideal way to increase profits for an American media conglomerate that owns a broadcast TV network.
3) The less benefit individual speculators can derive from moral hazard, the more they will utilize said markets.
Details are online at http://www.loveatmadisonandwall.com.
Given the above, the sooner media conglomerates start introducing/popularizing the aforesaid markets, the sooner a lot of top-quality entertainment programming will, in part:
1) increase awareness of (proposed) public policies that (would) put taxpayers on the receiving end of gratuitous moral hazard (e.g., increase awareness via a next-gen Jed Bartlet channeling Jon Stewart and Vietnam-era Walter Cronkite)
2) showcase elected representatives who protect taxpayers from gratuitous moral hazard
Thoughts?
Best,
Posted by: Frank Ruscica | April 10, 2008 4:26 AM
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