ABOUT NEW HAMPSHIRE.

My full wrap-up is up at TAP:

Democrats have now seen the two most-hyped contests of the primary to their conclusions. And both mattered. Because both validated the central rationale for the respective winner's candidacy. This has been, as the pundits say, a "change" election. But more than that, it's been, as Mark Schmitt called it, a "theory of change" election. What else could it be? The three frontrunners for the Democratic nomination are all relatively new senators who served the overwhelming majority of their terms during George W. Bush's presidency. Since Democrats have, at no point, enjoyed a veto proof majority, that's meant that none of them actually could effect legislative change. The closest anyone really got was John Edwards with his Patient's Bill of Rights, which was summarily rejected by the president and left to languish in Congress.

Without this ability to actually create change, all the candidates could do was construct plausible arguments for why they'd be change agents. Hillary centered her appeal around experience; having spent eight years in the White House, she was most familiar with the mechanics of the presidency, most adept at navigating the rigors of campaigning, and would be best able to win the general election and step smoothly and confidently into the job. Obama argued for the transformative potential of his own appeal; his unique political talents and evident personal magnetism would allow him to reach out to new constituencies and construct a broader progressive majority, and leverage that enhanced electoral power to force political change. And Edwards relied on the clarity of populism; his clear-eyed view of the pernicious influence of corporate greed would render him best able to mobilize Americans to confront it.

Since none of these candidates had actually created much change, voters were left to decide which argument made the most sense to them. Until Iowa. There, Obama's words became votes. His win demonstrated not just tactical superiority on the political playing field, but the ability to actually transform it, to reach out to new voters and expand the Democratic coalition. In Iowa, he created change. And in New Hampshire, he invoked it, repeatedly inviting listeners to imagine the "new majority" they would build.

But he was unable to replicate his Iowa success in New Hampshire. There, it was Hillary's theory of change, and her political appeal, that proved most successful at attracting votes. A plurality of voters told exit pollsters that she would make "the best commander-in-chief," and almost 90 percent of those voters pulled the lever for Clinton. Her experience did translate into votes. Additionally, women turned out in greater numbers for her, comprising three percent more of the Democratic electorate than they did in 2004.