A VOUCHER SYSTEM PART 2: THE CASE FOR.
Two days ago, I ran through the basic outline of the how the Emanuel/Fuchs voucher proposal works. (If you haven't read that yet, this post will be very confusing.) Today is the "pro" case for the plan. And here it is: this is a total transformation of the system. It does not build on the inefficiencies of the current structure, preserving them in amber for the next egenration. Rather, this is the closest we will ever get to single payer without entirely blowing up the private insurance industry. And since we're not going to blow up private insurance in the near-term, transforming them into something like publicly regulated utilities that might even compete to our benefit would be a pretty huge improvement.
The voucher approach is, in many ways, far superior to an individual mandate, an employer mandate, or a tax credit approach. Essentially, the government guarantees you health insurance, just as they would in a single payer system. You choose from a set of competing private plans -- but that's different than being forced to buy one of a set of competing private plans. Health care becomes a right, not a purchase. Where a mandate plan gives you a mechanism to achieve universality, a voucher plan simply is universal. There's a big difference.
But the big deal here is cost control. In health care, cost control is everything. At the current rate, health care will grow to 30 percent of GDP by 2030. That's money -- in the trillions -- that can't be spent on other things, either progressive priorities like universal pre-k or personal priorities like buying a home and taking a vacation. And what are we getting for the amount we spend? A health system where 47 million are uninsured, and experts estimate that 20 cents to 50 cents of every dollar spent on care is wasted on unnecessary or ineffective treatments. It's a tragically bad deal.
Our current system is so pricey because of its basic structure, which hides costs encourages overuse of resources, and has basically evolved such that it's very good at creating profits and quite bad at ensuring the health of a nation. So when evaluating health plans, a good rule of thumb is this: The closer it is to our current system, the less it does to control costs. The farther it is, the more it does.
The voucher system is very far indeed.
The plan is not only universal, but fully integrated. The health system, right now, has 800+ private insurers, all operating in their own little fiefdoms with hundreds of different contracts made with thousands of different employers and millions of individuals. You can't effectively regulate it because you can't get your hands around it. Add in Medicare, Medicaid, S-CHIP, the VA, the IHS, and all the other mop-up plans, and you're left with a dizzyingly broken and diffuse system.
The voucher plan ends all that. Medicare, Medicaid, and S-CHIP are closed to new applicants. They'll be gone within decades. The private insurance system is completely remade. Employer have no role in it. None. Whatsoever. The link between your job and your medical coverage is forever severed. People now secure care by giving a voucher to the private insurer that best fits their needs. The endless economic distortions and individual tragedies that came from locking people into their jobs and basing their medical coverage on company loyalty is over.
As I've argued before, integration is crucial for cost control. Controlling the system's spending requires changing the system. That's much easier, and more sustainable, if there's one structure to regulate, and to experiment in. Essentially, you get almost all the benefits of single payer. The government's power in that system doesn't come because they offer insurance, but because they pay for care. They basically do the same thing -- though once removed -- in a voucher system.
Additionally, there's the whole issue of getting private insurers to compete based on price and quality. In a voucher system, they can't deny coverage to anyone, they can't price folks out...they just take whoever comes. Additionally, the government pays them on a risk-adjusted basis (i.e, you get a lot more money for a diabetes patient than a healthy 23-year-old), so it doesn't even make much sense to discriminate based on conditions. In the past, insurers have been incentivized to compete in destructive ways. Their competition has been very effective, and created some real remarkable innovations in risk shifting, pricing people out, and figuring out who's a bad bet. If they start competing to attract business, however, there's a real chance their competition could create some genuine advances. If it doesn't, it would be trivial to add a public competitor. And if costs didn't go down, the system's financing structur would generate enormous pressure to add a public competitor, or pursue some other initiative that would cut spending.
We talked earlier today about how a VAT works, but not about how it fits into health care. The voucher plan is funded by a 10 percent VAT, which for these purposes, is a 10 percent sales tax. There are no more premiums, no more high deductibles. Just a national sales tax. This acts essentially as a global budget. It is extremely powerful cost control. If people want more expansive insurance options in the basic plan, they have to elect politicians who will raise the tax or cut costs. (Another option is that individuals can go outside the system, French-style, and buy supplementary insurance, and that could just become the de facto norm, as it is in France.)
This means, effectively, health spending will significantly decline, or at least cease its rapid growth. Much of what drives increases right now is that payment is so diffuse, and so the system grows without anyone making an affirmative decision to increase spending. Individuals think their employers pay. So they spend more than they otherwise might, and don't go to the barricades to change the system. And their employers do pay, but they just take it out of wage increases (which explains a fair amount of recent wage stagnation), which in turn keeps them from going to the barricades to reform the system. Thus, hospitals happily pass on costs to insurers, insurers happily pass on costs to employers, and so on. The funding is so complicated that the theoretically constituencies for cost control end up working against themselves, or thinking they've got the better deal and had best keep it.
So what you have is a lot of people making decisions that increase someone else's spending. In the voucher system, increases in spending would actually require the electorate to make a choice to pay more. That will bring down costs, because people do not like to pay more, and they will demand more efficiency, stronger bargaining, better comparative effectiveness data, etc. It will become a much leaner, more efficient, more effective system.
Arguably, nothing more progressive that could happen in our country than for health care to get cheaper, so families and the government have more money for other priorities. There's nothing progressive about wasting 20% to 50% of the dollars spent on health care. A more efficient system would probably have next to no impact on health outcomes (it may well be better, as Shannon Brownlee and others have argued), but it will free up tens, or even hundreds, of billion for other projects. And that's hugely important.
Tomorrow, the "con" case.
Feeds: 


COMMENTS (22)
In the liberal spirit of waiting for real facts, I'll withhold judgement until you outline the cons of the plan, but be forewarned (grin), I'll expect to see some strong arguments on how the basic voucher plan won't be wittled down (under the mandate of cost control) until it no longer covers decent care (especially for major illnesses, like cancer, transplants, and heart disease, mental illness, etc.). Then if standard coverage doesn't apply a solution, folks would be individually charged whatever the market will bear (and cherry picked, as well) for so-called supplementary policies that have no controls and for which they probably can't afford to pay unless family income is above true middle class ($50-75K/yr).
I'm reminded of Delta Dental Insurance: insurance that gets your teeth cleaned and maybe a tooth filled once a year, but all the major things you need are not covered.
Posted by: JimPortlandOR | June 18, 2008 2:56 PM
If you do away with Medicare I assume that the remaining Medicare trust fund would then be diverted to this new program.
Does a 10% VAT actually cover the costs for reasonable coverage for all? What is in the VAT? What is the analysis on a 10% VAT on sales? What does it do to the programs already supported by a sales tax should revenue drop due to diminished sales?
What controls are built into the system to stop payment avoidance? Are insurers just going to pay, or else? Do providers still need to retain staff to haggle with the insurance companies?
What happens to the VA?
Will this system guarantee that my particular situation will be covered as part of the basic package? If it doesn't this system has done me jack.
Posted by: Nat | June 18, 2008 3:35 PM
In health care, cost control is everything.
Amen!
There's nothing progressive about wasting 20% to 50% of the dollars spent on health care.
I would say at least 50% is wasted.
But... I am sure that with universal pre-k even more than 50% will be wasted.
Back when I was managing restarants I did a samll poll of working single mothers and found that they valued free pre-k at below $10.00/week. In other words if ask woudl they rather have $10/week or free pre-k they took the $10/week.
Posted by: Floccina | June 18, 2008 3:36 PM
BTW at risk of being a broken record:
IMO One big key to getting control of costs is for the insurer (state or company or other) to get the insured to help. Creative ideas to do this are needed.
Posted by: Floccina | June 18, 2008 3:43 PM
If you do away with Medicare I assume that the remaining Medicare trust fund would then be diverted to this new program.
The plan as described by Ezra does not eliminate Medicare -- it simply stops new enrollees. It would take decades to wind down the system.
Does a 10% VAT actually cover the costs for reasonable coverage for all?
I'm no economist, but I'm given to understand a well-run 10% VAT would likely bring in revenue equal to something like five to seven points of GDP. Given the continued existence of Medicare, and the fact that lots of healthcare (cosmetic surgery, co-pays, over the counter drugs, French-style supplemental health insurance policies, whatever else the government decides not to pay for, etc.) will continue to be paid for by private actors, the 10% VAT funding mechanism actually sounds fairly feasible.
Posted by: Jasper | June 18, 2008 4:10 PM
In France, Canada, and the UK supplementary funding is either illegal, restricted, or discouraged.
In Canada if your health problem is not cost effective you cannot buy it privately. You have to go to the States and pay the whole cost privately. In the UK there is a private system but you cannot add onto the public system (in most cases). In France the amount of supplementary care is limited to around 3% of your income.
Under this plan Americans are still at liberty to buy cost-ineffective drugs and treatments. An old lady with multiple brain tumors and a big wallet can still get that MRI even if basic care doesn't cover it. Even if there is a .1% chance of success some Americans will still pay outrageous sums for the possibility of an extended. This is backed up by comparing the healthcare spending of Americans in their last 3 months and comparing this to any other system.
So why exactly is spending likely to decline under this plan? If your old and rich (albeit less rich under this plan) are you not just as likely to spend as much as possible to extend your life?
And if your reason is preventive care, at least explain (Ezra has yet to ever do this). No medical journal I have read has ever found any significant benefits and most find the outcomes either ambiguous or dependent on the type of preventive care.
Posted by: gordon.gekkko | June 18, 2008 4:31 PM
1. Delta dental insurance is a poor example. The yearly maximums of today's dental "insurances" are somewhere in the neighborhood of $1400-1500. In the 1960's they were $1000-1100. It simply hasn't kept pace with inflation or the cost of doing dentistry. It's not insurance any more, it's a finite dollar amount that you have to spend each year on your oral health.
2. What about the training of doctors? A tremendous amount of funding for medical schools comes from CMS/Medicare to say nothing of the fact that every medical resident is paid through CMS/Medicare. Where is this money going to come from?
Posted by: Brent | June 18, 2008 4:37 PM
My key question--what does a voucher-approved plan cover, and how is that decided? Is it like the Oregon plan (which I highly approve)--here's the most cost-effective use of X dollars?
Posted by: SamChevre | June 18, 2008 4:54 PM
In France, Canada, and the UK supplementary funding is either illegal, restricted, or discouraged.
In Canada if your health problem is not cost effective you cannot buy it privately. You have to go to the States and pay the whole cost privately. In the UK there is a private system but you cannot add onto the public system (in most cases). In France the amount of supplementary care is limited to around 3% of your income.
Under this plan Americans are still at liberty to buy cost-ineffective drugs and treatments.
All public health systems do this. Taiwan pays for sham BS like "natural" chinese medicines which are nothing but snake oil. The UK NHS pays for homeopathy, which is another total sham.
In short, no country in the world has been able to get its public to accept a refusal of sham treatments.
Posted by: Anonymous | June 18, 2008 6:07 PM
"In a voucher system, they can't deny coverage to anyone, they can't price folks out...they just take whoever comes. Additionally, the government pays them on a risk-adjusted basis (i.e, you get a lot more money for a diabetes patient than a healthy 23-year-old), so it doesn't even make much sense to discriminate based on conditions."
I dunno, I actually think this is the biggest stumbling block. Basically, the risk-adjusted reimbursement has to be actuarially spot on, or else I think you'd run into the same problems with adverse selection vs cherry picking that we have now. And from the point of view of the insurance companies, I'm not sure how an individual who is currently too unhealthy to cover becomes a good risk just because the government is paying the bill instead of the individual. I realize the take-all-comers provision is intended to circumvent these issues, but I'm sure the insurance companies will figure out some sort of shenanigans.
Overall, of course, this plan is a massive improvement over the current system. No doubt.
Posted by: mark | June 18, 2008 7:17 PM
I have some questions:
1) Does the government, under this plan, determine a basic level of service that is required for a plan to receive vouchers?
2) If the answer to #1 is yes, on what basis will insurers compete if they don't compete on cost or coverage?
3) What about concepts like deductables, life-time maximums, and so on? Will these continue to exist?
4) Suppose I chose Insurer A because they have good customer service and are good at paying for things like doctors visits but are lousy somehow for if you're really sick. If I get cancer will I be able to switch to Insurer B who is known for being good at taking care of people who are seriously ill? This seems like it would be a lousy deal for Insurer B and a great one for Insurer A. Wouldn't that create a perverse incentive to be good to your insureds when they're well and nasty to them when they're sick?
5) Following along with question 4, wouldn't there be a strong incentive on insurers to get they're customers to switch plans when they get sick?
Posted by: Rob Mac | June 18, 2008 7:24 PM
Basically, the risk-adjusted reimbursement has to be actuarially spot on, or else I think you'd run into the same problems with adverse selection vs cherry picking that we have now.
Exactly. Does anybody seriously think the government will find a way to consistently (and to the satisfaction of insurance company shareholders) make it sufficiently financially attractive to insure, say, a diabetic or an MS sufferer or just a run-of-the-mill old person? I'm deeply skeptical. I can just imagine the disparities in new customer acquisition budgets -- you know, lots of ad dollars spent in Beverly Hills, not so many in Compton.
You might see a voucher scheme work with a very robust government reinsurance program, but (I predict) not without.
Posted by: Jasper | June 18, 2008 8:10 PM
How does this change the incentive for insurance companies to not actually pay for care?
Given that the premium is fixed, it seems like the biggest source of profit for insurers would be to pay less for care--i.e., to pay for cheaper (less effective) care, to look for excuses not to pay, and to make it as difficult as possible for health care providers to get reimbursed for the care they provide.
Posted by: FearItself | June 18, 2008 8:19 PM
Ezra,
As I've argued before, integration is crucial for cost control.
Except that it isn't, I've made this point previously. Besides price negotiations, there isn't an advantage to "integration" that couldn't be similarly achieved via effective regulation. In fact, you really could do the same on prices as well. Of course, what you lose with integration is the ability to be more flexible outside of any core principles that would be similarly fixed under a regulatory system. This is an extremely important point.
Essentially, you get almost all the benefits of single payer.
Lol. No bias in your analysis at all, Ezra?
If they start competing to attract business, however, there's a real chance their competition could create some genuine advances. If it doesn't, it would be trivial to add a public competitor. And if costs didn't go down, the system's financing structur would generate enormous pressure to add a public competitor, or pursue some other initiative that would cut spending.
So here's the other important point, I think you're missing the key design feature of voucher-based system. Costs of the system only go down, if voucher values go down. Costs only go up if voucher values go up. This point is clear. What is less clear is the implications-- insurance companies would have a much greater incentive to control costs. Currently, insurance companies have decided that its easier to collect a premium of X, and if their expenses are 110% of X, then they'll pass on those additional costs in next year's premium. With a voucher system, that dynamic no longer exists in the same way. An insurance company is going to be faced with figuring out how to controls costs within the voucher value of X, because if its 110% of X, then they lose money for that year. They can lobby government for an increase in voucher value for next year, but they won't get it to a level that would allow them to recoup their losses from the first year. So what does that mean? Insurance companies will be laser-focused on figuring out what utilization controls they need to implement to ensure their costs are below X. Its the only way they can stay in business. (As Ezra rightly points out, the other games played today would not be possible under this system.)
The other key component Ezra didn't mention is that the Regional Health Boards provide an evaluatory function for citizens. In other words, they would collect data on quality of health plans which would be shared with people to help make their plan selection. So for the several questions above that rightfully ask about insurance companies trying to shift their sick patients off their rolls by providing terrible service-- that data would be collected (e.g. satisfaction numbers) and provided via the Regional Health Board. In other words, providing bad care is also a losing proposition, because neither the healthy nor sick people are going to choose a plan with low satisfaction scores.
So gaming the system no longer exists, and insurance companies only make money by effectively keeping costs under the value of the vouchers themselves. Its a great plan in concept.
Posted by: wisewon | June 18, 2008 8:32 PM
How does this voucher plan differ in any significant way from Congress's attempt to control cost by enrolling everyone in Federally regulated HMOs? It seems most individuals would in fact be forced into HMOs. This seems like the logical next step to their stated plan from 1973. Ted Kennedy said everyone should be in an HMO funded and regulated by the Federal Government. Does the fact that the public overwhelming rejected HMOs not count for anything?
What if all the carriers in one metro area decide to only offer HMOs and I don't want an HMO? United Healthcare in the past 2 years has bought 3 of the largest carriers in NV and now controls 70% of the business. The majority of what they don't control are self funded employer and union plans. So once this law passes United Health will have 90%+ of the Nevada Market. Just about every citizen in the state will be forced to purchase care from a single Insurer who is paid by the Federal government. When the Federal government needs to cut spending they just lower what they pay United Health who cuts our benefits. What choice do we have? it would appear none.
I'm getting ahead of things though, I'm sure you will discuss this all in great detail Ezra, ye of infinite Healthcare knowledge.
Posted by: Nate | June 18, 2008 8:40 PM
"Essentially, you get almost all the benefits of single payer."
Except of course you don't get what is probably one of the most important benefits of single payer.
One of the big ideas behind single payer is that you would reap massive cost savings by reducing the administrative costs. I've seen estimates that 20-30% of health care costs are administrative. All those billing specialists that medical providers have to have in order to figure out how to get paid. All the people at the insurance companies getting paid to review claims. One of the nice things about a true single payer system was that you could reap cost savings with out actually having to cut care.
Of course this voucher system doesn't have that property. This voucher system seems to leave us with a lot of the same problems of our fractured health care system.
Posted by: Jason K | June 18, 2008 10:05 PM
Jason K,
"All the people at the insurance companies getting paid to review claims."
And who do you think pays claims in a single payor model the claim pixie who gladly works for magic dust?
The nice myth about single payor is it saves money. Sadly when the light of reality shines down all examples of single payor in the US are less efficient then the insurers and TPAs on the private side. It's all documented, with information so readily available why are you looking at estimates? They are estimating becuase they can't supply any real data to back up the claim
Posted by: Nate | June 19, 2008 12:31 AM
The nice myth about single payor is it saves money.
Yeah, and even when it does save money it's only in mythical lands like Narnia and France.
Posted by: DMonteith | June 19, 2008 1:48 AM
All of this only works with
a) a well-informed consumer who actually picks coverage in a sensible way and
b) insurance companies that decide to offer plans with enough differentiation to make a) meaningful.
And that's after we assume that risk-adjusted reimbursement blah blah blah actually works and isn't just cost-plus.
I would love, for example, to join a plan that offers family coverage with less than a seven-grand family deductible. Haven't found it in my state, don't expect to.
Posted by: paul | June 19, 2008 11:35 AM
Ezra--
Great post. (I've also written about Emanuel's plan which I find very attractive for many of the same reasons. But you've put it very well.
I'm looking forward to part II.
IN this thread people have raised some questions which Emanuel answers in the book:
'Does the government, under this plan, determine a basic level of service that is required for a plan to receive vouchers?
Yes it does--it's a very high-level comprehensive package--better than Medicare and better than 80% of employer-based plans.
2) If the answer to #1 is yes, on what basis will insurers compete if they don't compete on cost or coverage?
Insurers will have to compete on Quality--i.e. the quality of the doctors in their network, the quality of the hospitals (this means providing incentives for hospitals to reduce infections, etc.).
They can also compete on customer service: how long does it take to get an appt? If you call with a question does the customer service person have an answer?.
3) What about concepts like deductables, life-time maximums, and so on? Will these continue to exist?
There is no deductible and co-pays are minimal. There is no life-time maximum.
How, then, do they control costs? Under Emanuel's plan, an independent "Comparative Effectivess Institute" will compare new drugs, devices to what is already on the marekt to see if they are indeed more effective than the lower-priced products and procedures that they are replacing.
The FDA does not do this now because lobbyists for these companies won't let them. But since Emanuel's plan is funded by a VAT tax, this health plan won't have to keep going back to Congress for new appropriations--so it will be insulated from the lobbyists. (Revenue from the VAT will rise with inflation.) 2) If the answer to #1 is yes, on what basis will insurers compete if they don't compete on cost or coverage?
3) What about concepts like deductables, life-time maximums, and so on? Will these continue to exist?
4) Suppose I chose Insurer A because they have good customer service and are good at paying for things like doctors visits but are lousy somehow for if you're really sick. If I get cancer will I be able to switch to another insurer I get cancer will I be able to switch to Insurer B who is known for being good at taking care of people who are seriously ill? This seems like it would be a lousy deal for Insurer B and a great one for Insurer A. Wouldn't that create a perverse incentive to be good to your insureds when they're well and nasty to them when they're sick?
See answer below to question 5.
5) Following along with question 4, wouldn't there be a strong incentive on insurers to get they're customers to switch plans when they get sick?
No--Because if an insurer winds up with more sick patients than the average insurer, the government gives that insurer extra money to cover the extra risk.
So insurers will no longer have an incentive to avoid sick patients. And they will have an incentive to become known for being very good at treating cancer because that will bring more customers--both cancer patients and people who worry about getting cancer.
Yes.
Posted by: Maggie Mahar | June 19, 2008 1:39 PM
Insurers cannot drive down costs. All they can do is lower reimbursement rates. This means that providers will seek out customers that need the services for which the reimbursement is above costs and to quit providing procedures for which the reimbursement is set too low. Since hospitals and providers can do and not do procedures, the government basically determines what procedures will be available in the U.S. and those that do not.
There is no provisions for funding medical research. There is no provisions for funding training. All providers would be looking to lower wages which will create more shortages of practitioners. Many good ideas will idea because reimbursement will be set too low and thus, no one will offer the procedure or purchase the device or prescribe the drug.
There is no allowance for eye care, dental, prescriptions. Will the government really start paying (through the voucher) for lasik, glasses, dentures, and breast implants?
The idea that current healthcare costs can be lowered from 16% GDP to 8% GDP is laughable. Anyone interested in a career in healthcare would have to be insane to enter the field in such an environment.
Posted by: superdestroyer | June 19, 2008 2:53 PM
DMonteith,
Your welcome to take your single payor to either of those places.
Maggie Mahar,
Curious, why do you call these facilitators insruance companies? From your discription I don't see them assuming any risk nor providing any insurance.
The biggest problem today is utilization. People have low out of pocket so they consume a lot of it. Heck if you pay the premium mines well use it. Does it not seem a little counter productive to lower their out of pocket cost even further? Are you trying to collapse the entire economy?
By what logic, or lack there of, is it cheaper for me to pay VAT to the government to pay vouchers to an Insurance company to reimburse my doctor? Couldn't I just paythe doctor myself and save 2-3 steps and 20%?
Was this proposed as a serious plan or is it really someone being a joker and publishing the dumbest ideas they could come up with and selling it as a real plan?
Posted by: Nate | June 19, 2008 8:11 PM