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THE SURGE'S HELPERS.
To sharpen one of the arguments from my earlier post, when analyzing reduced violence in Iraq, you have to try and figure out the mechanisms, and whether they represent real changes in the underlying situation or ephemeral improvements that will worsen as soon as our deployment, or some other factor, changes.
As I understand the situation, experts credit four main trends for the reduction in violence: Some of it was due to ethnic cleansing in Baghdad, which effectively ended conflict in the city by leaving Shias without Sunnis to kill. Some was the Anbar Awakening, where a set of Sunni tribes turned on al Qaeda offshoots that were threatening their autonomy. We armed these tribes, and their war was effective. Some was Sadr's decision to enhance his political legitimacy by directing his militias to temporarily stand down. Some was the addition of more troops dispersed through the actual communities. This made them more effective fighting units, and increased their ability to hunt insurgents.
Some of these effects are temporary. Some aren't. It's a safe bet that Sunnis aren't moving back to Baghdad any time soon, so the violence in that city should remain low. The Sunni tribes that participated in the Anbar Awakening won't welcome a resurgent al Qaeda, but nor will they necessarily welcome a centralized Shia government attempting to assert control. And now they're heavily armed. It's possible a deal will be struck, and it's possible a civil war will break out. Sadr's troops will remain quiet unless Sadr decides he wants to wage a guerrilla war. And our troops will only be there so long. Our force density might have convinced some of the actors to lay low, but as the Other Klein argues, our forces won't be there forever:
It was always clear that the militias, especially the Sadrists, would go to ground and wait out our presence rather than confront our superior military force. And that remains one of the biggest questions: What happens when we go? I would guess there are two possibilities, neither of which involves a very robust democracy. The first is a return to sectarian chaos, with our Sunni Awakening pals turning on the government, the Shi'ites fighting amongst themselves and the Kurds bidding the Arab Iraqis adieu. The second is the gradual transformation of Nouri al-Maliki, or some other Shi'ite, into a fairly classic middle eastern strongman. Maliki's popularity has skyrocketed because he has been able to use the Iraqi Security Forces intelligently in recent months. We've seen this movie before.Again, this is the universe of outcomes we're supposed to celebrate?But go we must, in an orderly fashion, the sooner the better--this war is simply too expensive and too exhausting for our military. And it is currently drawing crucial resources from the more important war in Afghanistan. And that is why the right-wing triumphalists shouldn't get too triumphal: this war has been a terrible mistake from the start...The surge has reduced violence. We should all be thrilled about that--and honored by the brilliance of those who have served in Iraq. But what we're talking about here is whipped cream on a pile of fertilizer--a regional policy unprecedented in its stupidity and squalor.
Photo used under a Creative Commons license from Slagheap.
COMMENTS (4)
"The second is the gradual transformation of Nouri al-Maliki, or some other Shi'ite, into a fairly classic middle eastern strongman. Maliki's popularity has skyrocketed because he has been able to use the Iraqi Security Forces intelligently in recent months. We've seen this movie before."
Lebanon doesn't have a strongman.
Turkey, which borders Iraq and is a member of NATO, doesn't have a strongman.
Maliki doesn't need to turn into strongman. The big question mark is Iran and whether or not Israel attacks, but I have been impressed with Maliki.
Posted by: Peter K. | June 24, 2008 3:16 PM
Lebanon's civil war lasted fifteen years, and it hasn't exactly been a beacon of stability since then. Turkey's political history differs in several important ways from Iraq's; for instance, it hasn't been under foreign occupation in I don't know how long, but at least since the end of the Ottoman empire. Lebanon isn't an encouraging model, and Turkey isn't a plausible one.
Posted by: Matt Weiner | June 24, 2008 5:08 PM
Those troops have terrible posture. Especially the officer out in front. Straighten up, that man.
Posted by: ajay | June 25, 2008 4:58 AM
"Turkey, which borders Iraq and is a member of NATO, doesn't have a strongman."
No, it has strongMEN. They're called "generals", and they pretty much broker political life in Turkey. This isn't in itself a bad thing, since they have managed a sort of detente with the Islamist factions in Turkey. But to somehow pretend that Turkey isn't a semi-authoritarian state is kinda wishful thinking.
Not to forget that there's a history there: a certain Mr. Ataturk was the prototypical ME military caudillo.
Posted by: FDChief | June 25, 2008 1:38 PM