meh.

So resource limits (cash) weren't decisive. That will rarely be true in yet to come contests.

I don't care whether Dean or Emanuel get the 'credit' for 2008, but do care what will make the party stronger over several decades ahead. On this basis, the 50-state strategy seems a clear winner because it builds and waters the roots rather than milks the cow. Cows do go dry. Dependence on big contributors is a loosing strategy for a progressive party in the long run.

"But so was Emanuel, whose efforts at targeting and recruitment one dozens of seats"

Is Yglesias's tendency for typos and especially homonyms infectious or something?

I think this is about right: if you remember 2006, there were lots of late million-dollar DCCC injections in Rahm's pet races (Tammy Duckworth in Illlinois, Diane Farrell vs. Chris Shays in CT) and a fair few squeakers where the Dem lost out (Larry Kissell in NC, Christine Jennings in FL).

The problem with the DCCC targetting, in the context of the 50-state-strategy, was that it encouraged a degree of over-attachment to hand-picked candidates and the encouragement of self-funding DINOs -- most notably Tim Mahoney in Florida, who of course fucked his way out of Congress this year, but also the 2x4-brained Heath Shuler and a bunch of Blue Dogs.

But it's also worth noting that 2008 wasn't just about money: recruitment had a big role to play. You could get good self-funders and good grassroots candidates where the GOP field was whittled down by retirements and potential candidates sitting out the primary.

In retrospect, though, the 2006 over-investment in those defeated DCCC candidates doesn't feel like too much of a waste. And neither Dean nor Emanuel were responsible for the fully-contested primary, which established ground operations in states like NC and IN that paid off in the general.

Still, the point of both the DNC infrastructure and the DCCC's funding was a degree of nimbleness: the first priority was to get decent candidates in every district, then if a race unexpectedly turns competitive, to have people on the ground to notice and money in the bank to make a difference. The Red-To-Blue list went part of the way, but there were still examples -- the south Florida races, in particular -- where there was institutional reluctance among House Dems to step up against their in-state GOP colleagues.

As JimPortlandOR (a fellow Portlander!) wrote, let's not get carried away here and assume that something that was true this time will ALWAYS be true. We were lucky that we had enough cash to be able to use both strategies. Will that ALWAYS be the case? Probably not. And when that happens, I still have my money on the 50-state strategy.

Off topic, but I wanted to draw your attention to this healthcare related story before I forget:

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22237

This is missing one of the main points of the 50 state strategy. You never know when the situation will afford competing in alabama, or idaho, or indiana. Whether its because of an indicted incumbent, or a bad economy that generates a democratic wave, the point of a 50 state strategy is to be in position to compete if and when that situation arises.

So I disagree with Ezra here: if we had been in a place with too much money, but absent Dean having done a whole bunch of organizing BEFORE THAT POINT, that money could not have been effectively used.

On the money question -- I wouldn't have donated money to Democratic organizations if I hadn't believed they were doing something different than the same old losing strategies.

I had never wanted to give a dime to the DNC before Dean made it seem worthwhile.

Nor would I have given as much to the Presidential candidate if I thought it a lackluster choice likely to fail.

Your ending paragraphs make it seem like the cash was pre-supposed to have been there, while there may be a relation between organization and candidate appeals & strategies and donations.

JWill is right, readiness to compete is important, but to be opportunistic, but also to build over time.

El Cid is also right. The money did not just happen to come in, it came in for a reason.

I think you underplay several factors: a) considerable funds were raised from red states, some clearly because they (finally) didn't feel ignored, b) party-building is, as it turns out, critical, c) intelligent givers, seeing the DNC finally getting that, opened their wallets, d) a national sense of purpose and unity, resulting in considerable momentum and, yes, considerable cash, was generated.

Rahm certainly wasn't all wrong, but Dean was way more right. And if it hadn't been for Dean and some allies, it's not at all clear that Rahm would have gotten all this. I'm not anti-Rahm; politicals I know well, even those who think he's an a*&hole say he always delivers what he says he will. But in this case, it was Dean who was the clear, far-sighted thinker, right when it was needed.

THE INTERNET IS THE WINNING HAND, the money machine.

I agree with Drinkoff-- this analysis assumes that the variable was merely one of output, whereas the 50 state strategy correctly suggests that appealing to a wider spread of voters (even in otherwise less-competitive states) will drive fundraising. it may not pay for itself (the Democrats not being enamored of the Laffer curve), but to the extent that elections are national refferenda, the absolute amount of money spent may be more important than the targeting. To that end, a 50 state strategy driven by small donors may have been a contributing part of the Democratic windfall.

I'd like to see some analysis on regional donation patterns, actually.

What Jwill, El Cid, Drinkof and Anthony Damiani said so much better than me: 50 states, lots of money trumps 2 or 3 'battlegrounds' and lots of money. Every election since whenever has hinged on the 'battleground states' not on the rest of us. This election made everyone I know feel like their vote counted. All 50 states were important, for once. Inclusive, not exclusive.

El Cid has it right. You've got to look at causality. Where did all the money for the DNC and D-Trip come from? I can't imagine they were pulling in record hauls entirely from the liberal-elite coasts. Some of this had to come from North Carolina and Missouri, and Wyoming, and Indiana, and you get the idea. Those donors were likely encouraged by seeing an actual Democratic party in their back yard. Many would have been attracted to the party and encouraged to donate by local organizers.

Obama also probably had massive coattails. He was a charismatic candidate with a spooky-good campaign and the correct positions on a bunch of big issues, running against a lackluster, bumbling Hooverite during an economic crash. Dean could have been a disciple of Emanuel and the party would still probably have done better than in 2004.

This is just a problem with drawing conclusions about the results of elections: the sample size is so small that there are multiple causes for everything.

Where did all the new money come from? Did the underpants gnomes just deliver it, or did someone find new ways to raise it?

I don't know, which is why I'm asking. Seems like that's the key.

As in many situations, money is the lubrication between all of the egos !