AN AGRESSIVE IRAN POLICY WOULD BE WHAT, EXACTLY?

Like most liberals with a sense of history, I'm naturally sympathetic to arguments that the United States should be doing everything it can to support anti-authoritarianism around the world -- it's very easy to think of the Lincoln Brigades, World War II, etc., and wish that our country would do more to stand up for its principles abroad, especially while haunted by recent failures of this impulse in Rwanda and Darfur. But the damage the last administration did to U.S. credibility and the scarring experience of the Iraq War, which took many a well-intentioned liberal into neoconservative territory before whipsawing them back to chagrined reality, demand that we consider whether our ideas would be productive or counterproductive in practice. That's why, reading this piece in The New Republic, I have to ask: what exactly is Nader Mousavizadeh advocating Obama do? Here's a relevant except (emphasis mine):

A prisoner of conventional thinking on Iran, the most popular American president in a generation was effectively rolled by a cartel of aging, unelected theocrats into believing that a strong statement of support for democracy could be manipulated into an imperialist intervention. ... Alas, this was a loss of nerve with likely dire consequences.

First, a movement for greater pluralism and the rule of law that was manifestly to the advantage of the United States has been silenced. Second, an emboldened hardline leadership will likely present even greater conditions for meeting with the United States and, at those negotiations, prove more reluctant still to seek common ground. Were this a matter simply for Iran, or for U.S.-Iranian relations, it would be bad enough. But there is a third, more ominous threat looming on the horizon--an Israeli military strike on Iran's nuclear installations.

There is no serious alternative to an adversarial engagement with Iran that includes all key bilateral issues, beginning with areas of common interest and ending with the nuclear question. But, by allowing the regime to dictate the lessons of 1953, and honoring too little and too late the people's movement of June 2009, the president has made an exceedingly difficult task all the harder for himself. An outstretched hand needs to be directed by a head held high -- confident in its own principles and values, responsive to the aspirations of the Iranian people, and signaling to the regime that two can play the game of tough-minded diplomacy.

For one, I'd argue that Obama did offer strong support for universal democratic norms, and it has been used by the Iranian regime to cast blame for civil unrest outside the country. Mousavizadeh believes that Obama's statements came too late to help. But what would have changed had Obama spoken earlier or more harshly? What more could he have done, short of direct action? If you want to be morally serious about an argument that the U.S. did not do enough, you must make clear what ought to have been done and how that would have changed the facts on the ground. An earlier or stronger statement from Obama would not have protected demonstrators from Khamenei's thugs or prevented a movement from being silenced. If there is an argument that his words would have changed facts on the ground, it isn't in this piece.

On the other hand, the idea that "just words" wouldn't have helped protesters could be construed as an argument against engagement -- if the Iranian regime won't hear the international community out on this issue, why should they be receptive to discussions about their nuclear program? But there's a difference between adopting a position and engaging in negotiations. Any international bargain with the Iranian government would be just that -- a deal, with policy changes and compromise. There was no deal Obama, or anyone in the international community, could offer a regime in existential peril to prevent it from crushing domestic opposition. That's why casting aside the policy of regime change is the only way to engage with whatever government eventually comes to power in Iran -- Khamenei and his ilk will not stop their nuclear program if they believe our goal is topple them. Perhaps sanctions are the answer to both questions, but those sanctions depend on the cooperation of the European community, China and Russia to be effective -- it's likely that the EC would cooperate now, but would Russia, where Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was welcomed after the election?

That's why it's gratifying that Mousavizadeh recognizes that "there is no serious alternative to an adversarial engagement with Iran" and that the threat of an Israeli strike on that country's nuclear program is indeed an ominous one that would likely lead to broader destabilization across the region. The demonstrations in the aftermath of the Iranian experiment were inspiring and worthy of support, but -- sadly -- there was little more the United States government could conceivably do. I'm with Michael Walzer: Only civil society can engage with the Iranian opposition in a productive manner.

Further Reading: Iran Strategy After the Election.

-- Tim Fernholz