WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN DONE...

While there has been some fabulous blogging in Left Blogistan about developments in Pakistan, a lot of bloggers (including myself) have preferred to stand back, in large part because we have nothing useful to contribute to the discussion. One of the differences between Right and Left Blogistan is that lefty bloggers both a) defer to expertise, and b) assume that our readers are savvy enough to find the New York Times and Washington Post websites. But one thing we can do, at least, is point towards those who have a firmer grasp of the situation. Along these lines, let me recommend Joshua Hammer's "After Musharraf," and Hilzoy's extended discussion of recent events. In particular, Hilzoy has a nice discussion of what the U.S. might have been done to forestall the crisis:

First, we could have used our own troops to capture bin Laden and the al Qaeda leadership at Tora Bora; and second, we could have done Afghanistan right, rather than diverting our attention and our resources to Iraq when they were needed in Afghanistan. This would have made an enormous difference. Had we captured bin Laden and significant chunks of the al Qaeda leadership, we would not have had to spend nearly as much time or capital pressuring Musharraf to hunt them down in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan. And had we done Afghanistan right, in all likelihood the parts of Pakistan that border Afghanistan would not now be the staging area for a war. As things are, we have had to lean on Musharraf to do a lot of work for our benefit in the Tribal Areas, and elsewhere along the Afghan border.

Right, although some of this falls into the "easier said than done" category. In particular, I'm uncertain that seizing Bin Laden would have prevented wider unrest in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as many of the causes of that unrest seem more concentrated around the survival of the Taliban leadership than of Al Qaeda leadership. I think it's also fair to observe that the unrest in Waziristan is probably the best argument I've heard against the invasion of Afghanistan; no invasion, and it seems possible that many of these problems never would have developed. That doesn't, of course, mean that the invasion was a bad idea on balance, but trading Pakistan for Afghanistan isn't a net positive for the US, much in the same way that trading Iraq for Turkey would be a terrible idea. Hilzoy and Hammer also have some interesting ideas going forward:

America may best serve its interests, then, by pulling off a balancing act: reinforcing ties to the existing power structure in Pakistan (the armed forces) while at the same time pushing hard for democracy. These two ends are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Indeed, although it bears noting that considerable modesty is required; Pakistan is a large and complicated country, and in the final analysis I suspect that what happens there will depend far more on local factors than on the behavior of Washington.

--Robert Farley