The Difference Between Reality and Expectations: Afghanistan.

This piece in the Times emphasizes something that comes up a lot regarding the McChrystal report, and many other approaches to Afghanistan: Whether or not a given strategy is a good idea, the ability to actually implement it in a reasonable time is simply nonexistent. This goes for the "civilian" surge, which is severely delayed; troop deployments, which are severely constrained by U.S. dwell policies; and now it applies to the training of Afghan troops, which is at the center of both the COIN view of Afghanistan and those who take a more middle-ground approach. It turns out that current timelines just aren't that realistic.

The latest reports offer new details that show just how tough it will be to meet General McChrystal’s training goal. Among the previously undisclosed conclusions: one out of every four or five men in the security forces quit each year, meaning that tens of thousands must be recruited just to maintain the status quo. The number of Afghan battalions able to fight independently actually declined in the past six months.

It seems that new NATO involvement may speed things up, but NATO troops often decline to accompany their Afghan partners into the field -- this probably doesn't help -- which is a critical part of the mentoring process. Once again, it seems that what the U.S. might like to do in Afghanistan may not even be possible.

-- Tim Fernholz